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MARKET FAILURE IN THE MARKETPLACE

OF IDEAS: COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND
THE PROBLEM THAT WON'T GO AWAY
Tamara R. Piety*
"[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itselfaccepted in the competition of the market....",
"Doubt is our product since it is the best means of
competing with the 'body offact' that exists in the mind of
the general public.
It is also the means of establishing a
2
controversy."

In Steven Shiffrin's seminal work, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First

attention
to
the
"romantic
Amendment,3
Shiffrin
calls
4
generalizations" in First Amendment jurisprudence and theory that
obscure the reality that "the commercial speech problem is in fact
* Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. I want to thank Ron Collins
and Jim Weinstein, the organizers of this conference, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 23-24, 2007), for inviting me to
participate as well as all of the other participants. Additional thanks to the participants at the
Seattle University and University of South Carolina symposiums on commercial speech, to
Rebecca Tushnet, Peter Oh, M.G. Piety and Reza Dibadj, to the students in my seminar on
commercial speech at Florida State University, and to my colleagues at Florida State University,
in particular Curtis Bridgeman, B.J. Priester, Brian Galle, Fernando Tes6n, J.B. Ruhl, Mark
Seidenfeld, and Robin Craig.
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. Memorandum, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Smoking and Health Proposal, at 4,
http://ltdlimages.library.ucsf.edu/imagesr/r/g/y/rgy93fO0/Srgy93f00.pdf, quoted in United States
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 191-92 n.726 (D.D.C. 2006); see also ALLAN M.
BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE
PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 159-207 (2007) (detailing the history of the tobacco

industry's efforts to create an appearance of uncertainty about the health consequences of
smoking where no real uncertainty existed).
3. Steven Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation:Away from a General
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (hereinafter Shiffrin, Economic
Regulation]; see also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE (1990) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE].
4. Shiffrin, Economic Regulation, supra note 3, at 1212.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 41:181

many problems," 5 problems that raise "questions that will not go
away."6 Perhaps chief among these questions is how to discourage
fraud without suppressing freedom.
As it currently stands, the commercial speech doctrine creates a
category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment.7 This doctrine, first announced in 1976 in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,8
suffers from serious definitional problems. In order to qualify for
commercial speech protection, speech must concern a legal activity
or product and cannot be misleading.9 Defining "commercial
speech" so that the first element is a requirement that (roughly
speaking) the speech be truthful is not to say that all false speech is
non-commercial. Rather, it establishes that only truthful commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment. Presumably, some
speech is both commercial and false and therefore is not protected by
the doctrine. Indeed, it is probably fair to say it is precisely this
category, false commercial speech, which generates most concern.
Truth or untruth is (presumably) most often a factual issue to be
decided on a case-by-case basis. But "commercial" is a category.
Therefore, defining "commercial" is a fairly critical task.
Unfortunately, as has been discussed elsewhere, the Supreme Court
has not come up with a stable definition of "commercial" for
purposes of the doctrine. ° However, it is beyond the scope of this
essay to define "commercial." Here I will deal with the regulation of
false commercial speech and in the interests of simplicity, I proceed
from the assumption that there is some speech that is reliably
"commercial," which if false, has potential for substantial negative
consequences for the public health and welfare. Even though much
of the controversy in this area is about whether something is in or out
5. Id.at 1216.
6. Id.
7. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
However, as Professor David Vladeck has noted, although the test is nominally one of
intermediate scrutiny, in practice it has become a strict scrutiny test. David C. Vladeck, Lessons
From a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2004).
8. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
9. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
10. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword, The Landmark FreeSpeech Case That Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965, 1024-27
(2004).
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of the category "commercial, it is important to consider why the
Court might have thought it desirable to regulate false commercial
speech in the first place and to place these concerns against the
argument so often raised in support of greater protection for
commercial speech: that the best way to ensure truth in commerce is
to preclude government regulation of it. I believe this argument is
misplaced and I seek to illustrate why protection for commercial
speech is unlikely to result in better commercial information. To the
contrary, more protection is likely to result in more of what we
already have in abundance, false and misleading speech in aid of
commerce, which seems likely to exacerbate many existing social
ills.
In leaving false commercial speech unprotected, the commercial
speech doctrine seems intended to maintain the government's power
to regulate false commercial speech. With respect to core protected
speech, such as political or artistic expression, the First Amendment
forbids government regulation of truth. This is a key distinction of
commercial speech. Many observers believe it is an illegitimate
distinction." Others claim that regulation of commercial speech is
necessary and an appropriate function pursuant to the government's
regulation of commerce. 2 The government may regulate commerce
fairly freely pursuant to the commerce clause. 3 It does not have the
same powers to regulate speech protected by the First Amendment.
But of course, "[c]ommerce is linked to communication."' 4 Indeed it
11. See, e.g., Bruce E.H. Johnson & Ambika K. Doran, Amendment XXVIII? Defending
Corporate Speech Rights, 58 S.C. L. REV. 855 (2007); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990).
12. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA 32-48

(1999) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, DISSENT]; see also C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (1976); Thomas H. Jackson & John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65
VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979). For an argument that the purpose of the First Amendment is to enrich
political debate and that the focus on autonomy interests in the commercial and corporate speech
cases fail to advance this interest, see Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 1405 (1986). For a similar argument with respect to the corporate speech cases, see
Robert L. Kerr, Subordinating the Economic to the Political: The Evolution of the Corporate
Speech Doctrine, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 63 (2005). Shiffrin argues that the political argument, as
advanced first by Meiklejohn and later Sunstein, is flawed because it would exclude too much in
art, literature and science and is unrealistic if it depends on a very high degree of participation in
the electorate. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra, at 41-48.
13. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 12, at 39 ("Government's right to regulate in the
economic sphere is settled.").
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may have been the perceived parallels between the market and "the
marketplace of ideas" that gave rise to the commercial speech
doctrine.
In 1974, two years before the commercial speech doctrine was
announced, economist Ronald Coase argued that the policy, reflected
in the First Amendment, of minimal governmental interference in
"the marketplace of ideas" must represent the conviction that this
policy would be the one most likely to lead to the best results.15 If
so, Coase argued, why should we not have a similar faith in a policy
of non-interference in the marketplace for goods?16 At the very least,
he claimed, it was a "paradox" that called out for examination and
resolution. 17 Although in creating the commercial speech doctrine
14. Collins & Skover, supra note 10, at 1027. Collins and Skover's observation makes stark
the problem of distinguishing between speech and commerce, an effort that reprises the now
largely discredited speech/act distinction. See infra note 45. It is beyond the scope of this article
to explore the definitional margins that make these distinctions so difficult or to dictate how these
difficulties should be resolved in every case.
15. R.H. Coase, The Marketfor Goods and the Marketfor Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384,
384 (1974). Coase may have been inspired by an earlier article by Professor Martin Redish. That
article appears to have served as the Supreme Court's blueprint for Virginia Pharmacyin that the
Court adopted the same reasoning (protection for the listeners' interests), the same limitations
(only truthful speech protected), and many of the same rationales (incentives) for why
government might both protect some commercial speech while retaining some regulatory power
over it. See Martin H. Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). According to Professor Reza
Dibadj, both articles were preceded by an article by economist Aaron Director, who noted "a
remarkable similarity between the underlying basis for complete laissez faire in the market for
ideas and the market for economic goods and services." Reza R. Dibadj, The PoliticalEconomy
of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 913, 916 (2007) (quoting Aaron Director, The Parity of
the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1964)).
16. Coase, supra note 15, at 389. It is important to note that Coase's article was basically a
thought experiment, not a rigorously supported empirical argument or even a fully developed
theoretical position. At the outset, Coase clearly stated he was merely raising the issue of the
alleged paradox between assumptions regarding governmental competency to interfere with the
"marketplace of ideas" versus the marketplace for goods. He argued that speech and commerce
ought to be treated consistently. He did not purport to say whether that paradox should be
resolved in favor of more regulation for speech or less for commerce, although his other work
makes clear that he was in favor of less regulation for commerce. So it is a reasonable inference
that this argument was meant to harness intuitions and norms about the appropriate level of
regulation for speech to support his argument for less regulation of commerce. It is a testament to
the power of the metaphor of "the marketplace of ideas," as well as to the normative appeal of
words like "freedom," that his article ended up being used to support less regulation for both.
However, Coase's argument presupposes that there is no reasonable basis on which to distinguish
between speech and commerce. Many have disagreed with this premise and argued there is
indeed a distinction between speech and commerce that justifies inconsistent approaches, at least
as a constitutional matter. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, A Comment on Professor Wolfson's "The
FirstAmendment and the SEC", 20 CONN. L. REV. 325, 325-31 (1988).
17. Coase, supra note 15, at 386.
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the Court appeared to resolve the paradox in favor of more regulation
of speech rather than less regulation of commerce, in fact the
doctrine set the stage for the current dilemma commercial speech
presents to defenders of freedom of speech because it sweep within
the ambit of the First Amendment an enormous amount of speech
that had not previously been thought to be covered by the First
Amendment, thereby setting the stage for the relaxation of
governmental efforts to control commerce through the regulation of
speech related to it.
In the wake of Coase's question many scholars, public policy
analysts, and politicians heeded his call by proposing both that
commerce should be deregulated in many respects and that
commercial speech should be accorded the same status as political
and expressive speech rather than languishing as a second-class
citizen of speech. Moreover, in the years since the commercial
speech doctrine was created, the Supreme Court has applied an
increasingly rigorous test to governmental attempts to regulate
commercial speech. Its current interpretation of the Central Hudson
test 8 (the test for analyzing the constitutionality of laws regulating
commercial speech) is "so rigorous that it results in the virtually
automatic invalidation of laws restraining truthful commercial
speech."' 9 Many academic observers, organizations, and other
friends of the Court have urged the Supreme Court to either clarify
the commercial speech doctrine's application so that "commercial" is
defined narrowly or get rid of the doctrine altogether and extend to
commercial speech the same level of protection political and other
protected speech receives.2" These calls raise one of those "persistent
problems" Shiffrin identified-what to do about fraud?
Consider the following statements, all arguably commercial
speech, and all false. Should any of them be protected by the First
Amendment?
18. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 563-66
(1980).
19. Vladeck, supra note 7, at 1059.
20. See, e.g., Collins & Skover, supra note 10, at 995-98 (describing the amicus briefs filed
in Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), in favor of Nike's position that its speech was protected by
the First Amendment). For law review articles supporting expansive protection of commercial
speech, see sources cited supra note 11. Note that it does not follow that eliminating the
commercial speech doctrine means more protection for commercial speech. It could mean less
protection by returning commercial speech to the unprotected status it had prior to 1976.
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"Oxycontin poses a lower 'threat of abuse and
addiction than traditional, faster-acting pain killers."' 2
"Chemical tests have not found any substance in
tobacco smoke known to cause human cancer or in
concentrations sufficient to account for reported skin cancer
in animals."22
"[T]he fibers of asbestos . . .are not injurious to the
respiratory organs.""
Benefin (a supplement of shark cartilage) is a treatment
for cancer and HIV. 4
If commercial speech were offered more than the intermediate
scrutiny protection it is presently afforded,25 all of these statements
might be defended as opinion or speech on matters of public concern
and thus subject to the demanding standards of heightened scrutiny
found in cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.26 Although
one of the consequences of a heightened scrutiny test may be more
shelter from liability for false statements, the Court in Sullivan
thought it necessary to run the risk that some false speech would be
protected in order to ensure the appropriate level of protection for
valued expression. After all, "erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression27
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive."'
The Court further noted that "[e]ven a false statement may be
deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it
21. Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2007, at At; see also United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (2007).
22. Press Release, Tobacco Industry Research Committee, New Evidence Shows
Complexities
of Lung Cancer, Scientists Say (Sept. 27, 1960), available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nqh79d00, quoted in BRANDT, supra note 2, at 202. Brandt
notes that "industry researchers . . . were detailing carcinogenic substances in cigarettes and
potential strategies for their removal" when this press release was issued by the tobacco
companies' non-profit front group, the Tobacco Industry Research Center (later renamed the
Center for Tobacco Research ("CTR")). BRANDT, supra note 2, at 202.
23. SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE'RE EXPERTS: How INDUSTRY
MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR FUTURE 86 (2001) (quoting material
distributed in 1962 from Gulf Oil Company to its workers, quoted in Jim Morris, Worked to
Death, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 9, 1994, at Al).
24. United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F. 3d 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2005) (paraphrasing
claims made for shark fin supplement).
25. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980).
26. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27. Id. at 271-72 (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
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brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error. ' '28 The application of this
standard to commercial speech would offer not only shelter for fraud,
but it would represent a perhaps irresistible incentive to commit
fraud when making false statements is in a company's economic
interest.
Protecting freedom of expression is often justified on the
grounds that preserving freedom in the marketplace of ideas is the
method most likely to produce the most truth.2 9 Justice Holmes's
famous remark that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"3 is often
thought to support this claim. However, if many false statements are
currently made despite the possibility of negative sanctions, is there

28. Id. at 279 n. 19 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Blackwell 1947) (1859)).
29. Professors Goldman and Cox call this the Market Maximizes Truth Possession
("MMTP") theory. Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Marketfor
Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996). Professors Goldman and Cox offer a more comprehensive
(and more distinctively economic) discussion of the same issues I raise here and their article is an
important refutation of the notion that the operation of the market will produce more truth. A few
caveats though are in order. The First Amendment protects many interests besides truth. See,
e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970). Moreover,
simply because a particular expression is truthful does not make it particularly informative or a
valuable expression in every context. For example, standing on a street comer reciting the names
in a telephone book would involve truthful speech. But it is difficult to imagine any context in
which it would constitute political, expressive, or even useful speech for informational purposes.
Robert Post has also argued that the particular truth-seeking function that the First Amendment is
intended to protect is actually a fairly narrow one and that the restriction on governmental
intervention in the First Amendment is not applicable outside of that narrow area. Robert Post,
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,88 CAL. L. REV. 2353,
2365-66 (2000). Finally, "truth" is a highly charged word with many complexities, and
distinguishing between fact and opinion is often difficult. Nevertheless, making this distinction is
a common legal task. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed ...to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.") (emphasis added). For
purposes of this article, which claims that First Amendment protection for commercial speech
should not be expanded, the word "truth" is used in the same way that it is used generally in the
law; as a fact capable of proof or falsification. Used in this way it seems that, as professors
Goldman and Cox have noted, a "global denial of objective truth is unwarranted." Goldman and
Cox, supra at 8..
30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Robert Post argues that the use of
this metaphor is an "expression of American pragmatic epistemology" rather than an invitation to
actually apply economic theory. Post, supra note 29, at 2360 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Holmes
and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788 (1989)). For more on Holmes' connection to
the American pragmatists, see LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS
IN AMERICA (2001). For more on pragmatism in America, see CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN
EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM (1989). This pragmatism may have
been more directed to the perceived evils of government suppression than a prediction that
freedom of speech would necessarily result in the production of truth.
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any reason to suppose that more laissez-faire in the marketplace of
ideas will produce more truth?
Even supposing there is a market for truth, (and in many cases
there demonstrably is-as the existence of the magazine Consumer
Reports suggests), it is questionable whether the marketplace alone
will necessarily produce truth. In fact, the claim that the market
produces more truth is demonstrably false in many respects.3' There
is perhaps an even more troubling question of whether the public has
much of an appetite for truth.32 With commercial speech,33 there are
many structural incentives for speakers to engage in fraud, few
effective checks on false speech, and some indication that because of
personal preferences, social norms, or cognitive limitations, we
"can't handle the truth" 34 -or at least we are not demonstrating a
pronounced preference for it.35 Proponents of more protection for
31. See generally Goldman & Cox, supra note 29 (arguing that the MMTP theory is not
supported by the application of economic theory or by a comparison of the market operation
theory to the adversary system, an example of a non-market mechanism for the production of
truth). For a survey of other articles with this theme, see Michael Ruston, Economic Analysis of
Freedom of Expression, 21 GA. ST. L. REv. 693 (2005). See also Darren Bush, The
"Marketplaceof Ideas:" Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote's Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1107 (2000) (arguing the inappropriateness of using the market metaphor for interpretation of the
First Amendment). For a defense of the market treatment see Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in
an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1 (1986).
32. Whether a good is private or public may make a difference. If truth is a public good, it
will likely be under-produced. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 25 ("[P]rivate markets will
tend to underallocate resources to public goods."). In many circumstances, truth might be a
private good, that is, principally of interest only to the consumer of the information. However, in
terms of economic analysis, the First Amendment suggests that truth is also a public good. For
example, information about drug risks has been called a "public good." Bruce M. Psaty & Sheila
Burke, Protecting the Health of the Public-Institute of Medicine Recommendations on Drug
Safety, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1755 (2006) (proposing reforms for the FDA to improve
drug safety).
33. James Weinstein, Speech Categorizationand the Limits of FirstAmendment Formalism:
Lessonsfrom Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1091 (2004) (arguing that consumers not
only fail to sort out truth from falsehood in commercial speech, but that they may also lack the
necessary rationality to do so optimally).
34. A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment et al.1992). Tom Cruise plays a JAG
lawyer defending two marines against charges of murder in the death of one of their comrades.
His defense consists of showing that the death was an accident arising from an unofficial hazing
practice at Guantanamo Naval Base called a "Code Red." When cross-examining the base
commander, played by Jack Nicholson, about the circumstances surrounding the incident and the
practice of Code Red, Cruise presses him for the truth. Nicholson's character responds with
disdain, "The truth?! You can't handle the truth!" Id.
35. See BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007). Similarly, Cass Sunstein's argument that citizens' increased
ability to choose the information they want to hear, from sources that reinforce their existing
beliefs, is bad for a free republic, is an argument that does not seem to reflect a great deal of
confidence that truth will regularly triumph in competition with error. CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
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commercial speech often argue that protection is required to promote
the truth, expand the relevant body of information on a topic, and
provide balance to both "sides" in a debate.36 (These proponents
apparently assume that providing balance means providing more
truthful information.)3 7 If more protection for commercial speech
does not lead to more truth, which seems demonstrably correct, we
confront Coase's paradox: why should the government and the courts
prefer a laissez-faire approach with respect to the marketplace of
ideas and not the market?
The explanation is that the marketplace of ideas is a metaphor,3 8
Although some speech is
and perhaps an inappropriate one.
undoubtedly commerce and valuable for that reason, not all speech is
valuable simply because it has a market value. We often value
speech for reasons that have little to do with its cash value or its
economic utility. Applying the metaphor too literally runs the risk of
commercializing all speech or suggesting that speech's principal
value is its market value. 9 Nevertheless, since some have taken the
metaphor seriously, it is worth exploring the question: How good is
the market for truth, even with some regulation and only limited
protection? And how should we deal with "market failures" in that
Such failures presumably include; (1) the
marketplace?4 °
REPUBLIC.COM 112-13 (2001). For a very recent discussion of evidence that much of the public

embraces beliefs such as that the U.S. government had a role in the destructive events of 9-11 or
in flying saucers and the level of public ignorance more generally see, Nicholas D. Kristoff, 'With
a Few More Brains... N.Y. TIMES, WK14 (March 30, 2008).
36. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263-67 (Cal. 2002) (Chin, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the First Amendment ought to provide a "commitment and guarantee that both sides
in a public debate may compete vigorously-and equally-in the marketplace of ideas").
37. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
38. Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive
Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
169 (2004).
39. The trend to commercialize everything is beyond the scope of this article. However,
several writers have noted this trend as applied to many areas of social life previously thought to
be not appropriately assessed in purely market or economic terms . See, e.g., GARY CROSS, AN
ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY (2000) (history of consumer culture and society); VINCENT J.
MILLER, CONSUMING RELIGION: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND PRACTICE IN A CONSUMER CULTURE
(2005) (religion); JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF

HIGHER EDUCATION (2005) (higher education and research);; Katherine Mangan, A J-School
Adapts to the Market, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 10, 2007, at A8 (describing the remaking

of the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University into a more consumer oriented
model)..
40. Although this article terms failures to produce truth and associated failures as "market
failures," this may not conform precisely to that term as it is used by economists, Nevertheless,
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proliferation and acceptance of false ideas, (2) the suppression of
truthful information, (3) the failure to produce truthful information,
and (perhaps) (4) limitations on choice, and the channeling of the
exercise of preferences within those limitations (assuming that
choice is a positive good). Finally, is there a role for the government
to play in ameliorating the effects of those market failures? This
article uses evidence of these market failures under the existing
conditions to suggest that extending a broad First Amendment shield
to commercial speech is unlikely to produce more truth.4
As is so often the case, the use of the metaphor tends to
naturalize background distribution of entitlements protected by law
as if they represented a state of nature-a move that for some confers
instant legitimacy. " Although this article argues that the government
should continue to have the power to regulate commercial speech,
regulation is obviously neither a panacea nor necessarily a helpful
place to look in all cases for the amelioration of all these problems. 3
Similarly, a First Amendment shield for a broader range of
expressive activities connected with commerce is also not a cure for
Coase himself used the term this way when he observed that, "the results actually achieved by
this particular political system [minimal regulation of political speech] suggest that there is a
good deal of 'market failure,"' Coase, supra note 15, at 385. So I use the word market failure
here in the same way that Coase did in his initial article-to describe a suboptimal result.
41. There is some question of whether the truth is a "good" at all-if by "good" we mean
commodity. See Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 18. Moreover, if a truth is unpleasant, it may
not even be considered "good" as in normatively desirable.
42. Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 939, 956-58 (1985); see also Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 810-11 (1935) (arguing that
metaphors are undesirable naturalizations of legal concepts and result in nonsensical questions
such as, "where is a corporation?" for purposes of jurisdiction, given that the question cannot be
answered by empirical observation). But see Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
MetaphoricReasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114, 116271 (1989) (asserting that metaphors are inescapable in legal reasoning, and illustrating that Cohen
himself used metaphor). For a discussion of the role of metaphor in law generally, see Mark L.
Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845 (2007) (proposing that metaphor is one
of the key devices by which we overcome cognitive limitations and the mind/body problem,
helping us to translate abstract ideas into legal principles that may have some rough integrity over
time); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and ConstitutionalMyth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181 (2004)
(illustrating the important role of metaphor in creation of law); see also Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules andInalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (discussing how a framework for approaching issues in one area
of law can prove useful in approaching problems in other areas of law).
43. Arthur Best, ControllingFalse Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regulation,
Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1, 71 (1985) (arguing a legal
regime authorizing private enforcement actions for false advertising may be more efficient than
regulatory agency oversight).
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these "market failures," and in many cases may exacerbate them. In
other words, incentive structures, experience, and available evidence
suggest that extending more protection to commercial speech than it
already enjoys is unlikely to generate more truth."
I. MARKETS AND MOTIVES

Many things provide people with a motivation to speak, or, in
some cases, not to speak.4 5 Clearly, one of the most powerful
motivators is an economic gain. In many cases, the law presumes
money is a motive that automaticallycalls into question the ability to
make objective judgments.46 Indeed, arguments for deregulation and

44. For further development of this thesis, see Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of
CommercialExpression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).

45. For purposes of this article it is not possible to probe the definitional difficulties in
distinguishing between speech, action, and "speech acts." See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-84 (1968) (finding a distinction between the noncommunicative elements of the
act of burning a draft card from the symbolic elements in upholding petitioner's conviction for
burning his draft card). However, it is a very problematic distinction. One of the most prominent
proponents of the speech/act distinction was Yale law professor Thomas Emerson. EMERSON,
supra note 29, at 17. For an illustration of the difficulties in drawing speech/act distinctions, see
Frederick Schauer, Categoriesand the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 272-276 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories]. More vivid examples can be found in
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 28 (1993) ("Is a rape a representation of a rape if

someone is watching it?"). Although I argue elsewhere that Emerson offered the most
comprehensive collection of justifications for protecting freedom of expression, see Piety, supra
note 44, 1 part company with his proposal on the speech/act distinction and I am inclined to agree
with Schauer and MacKinnon that this distinction is ultimately unpersuasive.
46. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000) (entitled "Disqualification of Justice, Judge, or
Magistrate Judge"). Subsection (b)(4) provides that a judge should disqualify himself when "[hie
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary . . . , has a financial interest in the subject matter in
Id.; see also Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts
controversy or in a party to the proceeding ....
of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375,
387 (2003) (discussing § 455). Similar requirements for recusal or disqualification where there is

a financial interest are ubiquitous in the law. Even where involvement is not explicitly
prohibited, cautious counsel might advise a client with a financial interest to avoid involvement
as a decision maker because it might undermine the decision's credibility or legitimacy,
regardless of whether it was actually prohibited. Similar presumptions for disqualifications
(albeit rebuttable presumptions) govern conflicts of interests for members of a board of directors.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007) (stating that actions by the board with an interested
director are not void or voidable solely on the basis of a director's financial interest as long as the
director's interest is properly disclosed or there is evidence that the transaction is "fair"). In some
circumstances, a financial interest may create a rebuttable presumption of a breach of a director's
fiduciary duty. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997). However, even
where a majority of directors are interested, a transaction may still be upheld. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1981). For further discussion of these issues, see Julian
Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 854-71

(2004). For the view that the proper balance of deference has been struck in the application of the
business judgment rule to takeovers, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: DirectorPrimacy
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privatization often appear to be based on the notion that the
motivation to improve one's economic condition is such a singularly
powerful motive for acting that it is the most reliable basis, all other
things being equal, to efficiently allocate resources.
Of course Coase's question, to the extent it focused on the value
of the production and protection of the truth,47 did not capture all of
the interests the First Amendment was meant to protect.4" Moreover,
as Coase noted, the conventional understanding of the First
Amendment tended to obscure "that there is, in fact, a good deal of
government intervention in the market for ideas."49 Some of this
intervention is undoubtedly because of the variety of contexts and
interests implicated by so vaguely worded a protection. Indeed, it
was just this multiplicity of interests that led Shiffrin to suggest it
was unlikely that a single theory could adequately account for or
reconcile all First Amendment precedent or point the way to
Coase himself noted that simply
desirable results in all cases."
because these differing attitudes toward speech and commerce were
in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 787-90 (2006) (arguing for high degree of
deference to judgment of directors even in the presence of some (arguably) interested directors).
47. Coase appears to have been agnostic on the issue of exactly what the market was
supposed to be betterfor, noting that the public is often "more interested in the struggle between
truth and falsehood than it is in the truth itself." Coase, supra note 15, at 390. Presumably, he
was primarily interested in probing the issue of governmental competence, as opposed to market
mechanisms, for concluding what was in the public's best interest. Truth may be one of those
values, but not necessarily the only one.
48. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 29, at 6-7 (1980) (arguing that the First Amendment
protects notions of autonomy, truth seeking, the political process and social stability). But see
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1424-25 (1986)
(arguing that the autonomy interest is not a good fit with respect to for-profit organizations, and
that the protection of the political process should take precedence, in particular protection for
those with fewer resources to speak, to autonomy interests of such speakers).
49. Coase, supra note 15, at 390 (offering examples of broadcast regulation and public
education); see also Schauer, Categories,supra note 45, at 270-71 (listing examples of speech
not protected by the First Amendment); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765,
1768 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries] (noting areas of routinely regulated speech). For
more discussion of this conventional understatement, see Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-15 (1984); Michael Rushton, Economic
Analysis of Freedom of Expression, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 693, 700-02 (2005). Although Coase
criticized the soundness of judges' economic views he apparently failed to consider that
economists' views on the jurisprudence of the First Amendment might suffer from a similar
infirmity. Perhaps he dismissed too easily the fact that lawyers and subsequent judges are not
free to disregard "the approach to regulation of markets found congenial by the courts" because,
however bad it may be as economics, what the courts say is the law. Coase, supra note 15, at
384.
50. See Shiffrin, Economic Regulation, supra note 3.
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apparently paradoxical did not mean that "public policy should be
the same in all markets."'" Moreover, on the efficiency of the noninterference model he wrote, "Suffice it to say that, in practice, the
results actually achieved by this particular political system suggest
that there is a good deal of 'market failure."' 52 Accordingly, this
article discusses a few of the ways that there has been a good deal of
market failure in the commercial speech marketplace of ideas.
Granting more protection to commercial speech than it is currently
afforded is unlikely to correct this market failure."
As is now painfully obvious, what people most want to "buy,"
both literally and figuratively, may not necessarily be the truth.5
The popularity of an idea in market terms-how many people think
it is true-is not a reliable indicator of its truth.5 Thus, it is unclear
that a completely unregulated marketplace of ideas is likely to lead to
more truth, even if it is likely to lead to the production of more of
what people want to hear or believe. 6 While it is obvious that we do
not have perfect competition in the marketplace of ideas, it is also
true, as Burt Neuborne has suggested, that when it comes to
commercial speech, "no form of communication is more sensitive to
51. Coase, supra note 15, at 389.
52. Id. at 385.
53. For an argument that more protection for commercial speech would imperil the
constitutionality of many previously well-settled areas of regulation, see Tamara R. Piety,
Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike 's Questfor a ConstitutionalRight to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151,
188-99 (2005).
54. This is the thesis of a book by George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan in The
Myth of the Rational Voter, supra note 35. Shiffrin rightly questions whether it could possibly be
the case that all that is at issue here is, for example, what the majority of citizens think is more
important--drug prices or literature. He suggests that the exercise of governmental power
inevitably to involve some value judgments such that "supporters of the First Amendment need
not be at all embarrassed in suggesting that some speech, such as political speech, is more
important than commercial speech." SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 12 at 39-40.
55. Jim Lobe, Majority Still Believe in Iraq's WMD, Al-Qaeda Ties, IPS, Apr. 22, 2004,
http://www.ipsnews.net/intema.asp?idnews=23439. According to a survey published on this site
for the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, more people believed that scientists had a
consensus on the theory of evolution than believed in evolution themselves. PEW FORUM ON
RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PUBLIC DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF LIFE: RELIGION A STRENGTH AND
WEAKNESS FOR BOTH PARTIES 7-9 (2005), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religionpolitics-05.pdf, see also Editorial, Evolution and Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A34
(criticizing the dismissal of a state science expert who was apparently fired for passing along an
email about a distinguished professor's talk debunking intelligent design). If the democratic
majority believes a false idea (e.g., separate but equal, intelligent design), which value comes
first-truth or democracy? Similar questions are raised by CAPLAN, supra note 54.
56. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 18 ("If people valued falsehood, then perfect
competition would provide falsehood in a Pareto-optimal way.").
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the wishes and whims of hearers." 7 And this sensitivity may result
in the production of less truth rather than more, in direct proportion
to the palatability of that truth. At the very least, if truth is only one
of many things people value, perfect competition will only deliver
truth in the proportion that consumers value it.
One commentator described this problem as follows:
[Although t]he market model avoids [the] danger of
officially sanctioned truth ... it permits ... the converse
danger of the spread of false doctrine by allowing

expression of potential falsities. Citizens must be capable
of making determinations that are both sophisticated and
intricately rational if they are to separate truth from
falsehood. On the whole, current and historical trends have

not vindicated the market model's faith in the rationality of
the human mind, yet this faith stands as a foundation block

for most recent free speech theory. 8
This observation is echoed in what Ronald Collins and David Skover
have called "The Huxleyan Dilemma"" 9-that is, the tension between

the fear of repression and the promotion of a governmental
orthodoxy and, such as represented in George Orwell's 19846" and
the dystopian vision of a social orthodoxy imposed by powerful,
private actors such as the ruling corporations in Aldous Huxley's
Brave New World.6

57. BURT NEUBORNE, FREE SPEECH-FREE MARKETS-FREE CHOICE: AN ESSAY ON
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 13 (Assoc. of Nat'l. Advertisers 1987); see also Burt Neuborne, A
Rationalefor Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 437, 454-62
(1980) (stating that commercial speakers derive their First Amendment rights from the rights of
the listeners).
58. Ingber, supra note 49, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); see also Frederick Schauer, Free
Speech and the Assumption of Rationality, 36 VAND. L. REV. 199, 204-09 (1983) (critiquing
Franklyn Haiman's reliance on an assumption of rationality to support First Amendment doctrine
as empirically wrong (reviewing FRANKLYN HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1981))).
59. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE, at xxxxv (2005).
60. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
61. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). Perhaps it is no accident that the
publication of Brave New World coincided with the growth of fascism and predated global
awareness of the dangers posed by totalitarianism. Not surprisingly, George Orwell, writing
more than a decade later, after the conclusion of World War II and at the threshold of the Cold
War, felt that the danger of governmental orthodoxy was rather more acute. See ORWELL, supra
note 60. However, almost another decade after the publication of 1984, and deep into the Cold
War period, Huxley still believed the dangers explored in Brave New World had not only not
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Given recent events-warrantless wire tapping and searches and
detaining persons without charges or access to counsel or the
courts-it would be premature to conclude that Orwell's nightmare
will never (or has not) come to pass. 2 However, it is equally clear
that with the infiltration of marketing techniques into the political
sphere, Aldous Huxley's nightmare may not be that far away either.
Consider what Edward Bernays, often called "the Father of Public
Relations,"63 had to say regarding the role of an "elite" in a
democracy:
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the
organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important
element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this
unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible
government which is the true rulingpower of our country.
We are governed, our minds molded, our tastes
formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never
heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our
democratic society is organized. 6'
Bernays suggested that this sort of governing elite was inevitable as
the only way of "organizing chaos."65 He asserted that "the
presidents of the chambers of commerce in our hundred largest
cities, [and] the chairmen of the boards of directors of our hundred or
more largest industrial corporations"66 would be some of the

been averted, but were more pressing than ever. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD
REVISITED 2 (1958). For an updated version of this vision of a world dominated by corporations,
see MAX BARRY, JENNIFER GOVERNMENT, at front flap (2003) ("[T]he world is run by giant
American corporations (except for a few deluded holdouts like the French); taxes are illegal;
employees take the last names of the companies they work for; the Police and the NRA are
publicly-traded security firms; and the U.S. government only investigates crimes it can bill for.").
Author Max Barry's website contains running posts of material critiquing the infiltration of
commercial culture and commercial speech into culture generally. See http://www.maxbarry.com
(last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
62. See "Scooter" Libby and the President: Justice is not Blind, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2007,
at 13-14 (decrying President Bush's apparent willingness to be perceived as "above the law" in

the aforementioned circumstances).
63, LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS & THE BIRTH OF PUBLIC
RELATIONS, at ix (1998).
64. EDWARD L. BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 37 (Ig Publ'g 2004) (1928) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 60.
66. BERNAYS, supra note 64, at 59-60. He also included the presidents of labor unions,
professional and fraternal organizations, authors, educators, and "interest groups." Id. at 60.
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members of that "invisible government. ' 67 It surely is the case that
these elite shape much of the world as we experience it-news,
entertainment, law, opportunities, and choices. So one might say we
have arrived at the worst of both worlds. On one hand, the political
arena is dominated by a degraded level of discourse.68 On the other
hand, there is a veritable landslide of cultural junk in the form of
non-stop advertising and an abundance of entertainment that hardly
bothers to disguise its real function as marketing. As James Boyd
White put it:
[F]ar too much of our world of public speech consists of
forms of expression that are designed simply to promote the
sale of commodities or to advance a political position, and
do so with very little respect for the audience or regard for
the truth. Speech of this character works not by appealing
to the thought and experience of the person it addresses...
but through the manipulation of instincts, instincts that in
fact it does a lot to form. To put it in plain terms, I think
our public world is dominated by the twin evils of
advertising and propaganda; that these constitute in their
own way an empire of might; and that what to think or say
about this fact is a serious problem for us both as individual
people and as lawyers.6 9
Although White's lament applies to both commercial and
political speech, but only commercial speech has been subject to
regulation for its truth. And the protection for truthful commercial
speech is itself new. Until very recently, it was taken for granted that
the government had the right to control commercial speech. The
67. Bemays also called the member of this elite "invisible wirepullers." Id. at 60. Master
political strategist Dr. Frank Luntz, the man who gave Newt Gingrich the "Contract With
America" and turned the estate tax into the "death tax," is following in Bemays' footsteps when
he observes: "Sophistication is certainly what Americans say they want in their politics, but it is
certainly not what they buy." FRANK LUNTZ, WORDS THAT WORK: IT'S NOT WHAT YOU SAY,
IT'S WHAT PEOPLE HEAR 5 (2007). Luntz argues that simplicity is necessary for good
communication. He is undoubtedly right. Less clear is whether, in this area, the "products" that
the public "buys" ought to be the touchstone of truth, and whether there is a duty to convey
complicated truths to the public without over-simplifying and running the risk of, as Bernays put
it, attempting to get "approval of the masses" by manipulating their emotional reactions and
encouraging them to use mental "rubber stamps." BERNAYS, supra note 64, at 48-55.
68. See, e.g., FRANK RICH, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF

TRUTH FROM 9/11 TO KATRINA (2006).
69. James Boyd White, Free Speech and Valuable Speech: Silence, Dante, and the
"MarketplaceofIdeas ", 51 UCLA L. REV. 799, 809 (2004) (emphasis added).
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establishment of the commercial speech doctrine unsettled this
expectation somewhat.
The current proposals for complete protection for commercial
speech could potentially undo a whole regulatory structure that
reflects that the drafters took for granted the power to regulate this
sort of speech. If the same free-for-all typical of a political campaign
were applicable to speech in the marketplace, and caveat emptor
applied to all manner of advertising that is currently subject to some
truth in advertising restrictions, it would be an unsettling prospect
and difficult to imagine we would have more truthful information or
be better off. A First Amendment defense, if applied to commercial
speech, might well largely cancel out governmental power to
regulate commerce at all. As Fred Schauer put it, "[o]nce the First
Amendment shows up, much of the game is over.,70
Perhaps many observers would not view that as a bad thing.
However, the regulatory revolution in the twentieth century seems to
have had some role to play in improving the safety of food, drugs,
products and the security of the market. And many point to the
relaxation of regulation to be the reason for massive financial
failures, more poisoned food, toys, and air. So whether or not these
views are accurate, it seems at least imprudent to cast vast sections of
the U.S. Code relating to consumer protection, securities regulation,
environmental regulation, truth in lending, and others into the
rubbish bin without a close look at the implications of doing so.
On the other hand, recognizing prudential concerns in
eliminating governmental discretion to regulate does not equate to
arguing that regulation is invariably desirable. Regulation can be
costly and inefficient. And there is always the problem of agency
capture and outright corruption of those entrusted with regulating.
Nevertheless, the question remains-is there any reason to believe
that insulating false commercial speech by providing commercial
speech generally with more First Amendment protection will
successfully produce more truth as supporters of these proposals
imply? A look at the incentives and the "market failures" in the
current environment suggest that there is not.

70. Schauer, Boundaries,supra note 49, at 1767.
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A. Incentive Structures of For-ProfitCorporations

At the outset, there is a problem presented in confining this
discussion to commercial speech given that there is presently no
clear legal definition of what makes speech "commercial." 7 ' For
purposes of this discussion, however, commercial speech is defined
as speech by for-profit corporate speakers. Although this definition
captures much more speech than is obviously covered by the
commercial speech doctrine itself, this does not detract from the
point. Rather, since it encompasses speech that some might claim is
protected speech,7" it underscores the problem inherent in protecting
more of such speech because this article is most concerned with the
incentive structures of for-profit corporations.73 And these incentives
affect all speech by for-profit corporations, whether it is presently
protected or not. At least three features of the for-profit corporation
structure directly hinder the production of truthful speech and reduce
any expectation that these corporations will refrain from suppressing
speech when feasible.
The first feature is the diffuse structure of the corporate
organization in which management and ownership are largely
disconnected. Management acts on behalf of shareholders and the
corporation itself is organized for their benefit. Shareholders,
however, are nominal owners and have very little say in the day-today operations of the corporation and enjoy a very limited right of
intervention.74 Even if shareholders were inclined to trade off some
profit for a process that they found more consistent with their moral
commitments, corporate law makes it difficult for them to do so by
When shareholders
making it an all or nothing proposition.
disapprove of management decisions, such as using animals for
testing products, their usual remedy is exit--divesting themselves of
71. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1143 (2004); see also Weinstein, supra note
33, at 1141-42.
72. Remember that simply because speech falls outside of the commercial speech doctrine
does not mean it is protected speech. It could theoretically be protected non-commercial speech
or false (and hence unprotected) commercial speech.
73. This is, as I argue elsewhere, a more comprehensive definition of commercial speech as
it exists in the world. It is not precluded by the commercial speech doctrine, although some
decisions in the corporate speech area would have to be overturned in order for all the Court's
precedent to be harmonized. See Piety, supra note 44.
74. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 109-10 (10th ed. 2007).
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their holding.75 For a variety of reasons, including status quo inertia,
total divestment may seem too costly when it means giving up the76
whole of the investr,.ent plus incurring transaction costs.
Moreover, exit as a response to management practices with which
the shareholder disagrees is not easily disaggregated from any other
reason for exit and shareholders cannot expect that managers will
reliably understand the signal sent by exit as a response to business
practices with which they disagree. This further decreases the
incentive to use exit as a strategy to express disapproval of
management and encourages shareholders to consider only their
economic well being.
The primacy of the financial interest, typically referred to as the
"bottom line, ' 77 is the second structural problem with respect to
speech. For-profit corporations, unlike the human beings who run
them, have only one interest 78-- the maximization of shareholder
value.79 The precise meaning of that interest in any given context,
and whether it should be measured in the short or the long run,
makes this an interest that is not as clear-cut as it might appear at
A corporation's managers and directors have the
first blush."
discretion to resolve this definitional ambiguity pursuant to the
business judgment rule, a legal doctrine that affords them wide
75. For a discussion of how this makes a "shareholder democracy" different than a political
democracy, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). For a discussion
of why corporations should not be considered democracies of any kind, see Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of CorporateLaw, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41
(2005).
76. The difficulties of exit as a way to signal disapproval of a decision was one of the factors
the Supreme Court found significant in distinguishing between for-profit and not-for-profit
organizations in the context of campaign finance issues. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990). The Court's recent decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc., 27 S.Ct. 2652 (2007), may have called into question the viability of this distinction.
77. For a book arguing that this incentive structure makes "good people do bad things," see
RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE Do
BAD THINGS (1996).
78. Professor Daniel Greenwood has argued this comparison actually involves assessing the
interests of a fictional shareholder who, like the economists' "rational man," is more unidimensional in his interests than a real human being. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders:For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S.CAL. L. REV. 1021
(1996).
79. "There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value." Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End ofHistoryfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
80. See, e.g., The Ones That Get Away: Accounts Are IncreasinglyMore Art Than Science,
ECONOMIST, July 30, 2005, at 65-66.
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latitude in assessing which decisions will be most profitable for the
corporation and, ultimately, for its shareholders. 8' This discretion is
wide enough to encompass expenditures for speech that are not
obviously related to furthering the corporation's business interests,
such as expenditures for an ad supporting a local referendum or a
donation to the opera.82 Nevertheless, all speech by for-profit
organizations can be traced back to those business interests. 3
While economic and political interests are undoubtedly
Economic
intertwined,84 differences do exist between them.
interests, expressed in terms of growth or profit, are undoubtedly
narrower than political interests, which are typically informed by a
range of moral and social concerns. For instance, in the debate over
the use of the death penalty, some might assess the question of
whether a death penalty is appropriate through the lens of the
financial costs associated with having a death penalty, while most
people probably believe that the costs of executions, or any potential
profits, are irrelevant in answering this question because the retention
or abolition of the death penalty is a moral question unsuited to an
assessment on a cost/benefit basis.85
81. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 74, at 156-62.
82. For a paradigmatic case, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Il1. App. Ct.
1968) (upholding the Chicago Cubs' board of directors' decision not to hold night games at
Wrigley Field on the grounds that baseball was a "daytime sport" and night games might
encourage audiences that would eventually cause a decline in property values in the surrounding
area). In retrospect, the board's reasoning seems like a flimsy justification for refusing to avail
the organization of the gate revenues expected from night games. Nevertheless, the court
indicated it would not second-guess the board's reasoning in favor of the shareholders' arguments
as long as there was a reasonable basis for the board's decision. Id. at 779-83.
83. Some commentators have argued that the form of the speech, rather than the for-profit
identity of the speaker or content, is dispositive for the question of protection. See, e.g., Bruce
E.H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is the Key to Identifying
CommercialSpeech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243 (2004).
84. Elsewhere I argue there is an identity between the economic and the political interests
and of an entity, created by operation of law, for conducting business where the purpose of the
law which constitutes it is to create rules for the organization and protection of the conduct of
legal business. See Piety, supra note 44. Representatives of business entities, such as The Arthur
W. Page Society, have themselves suggested as much. "[Blecause corporations are entities
whose decision makers owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and owners, no responsible
corporatespokesman speaks on a company's behalfwithout being concerned about the effects the
statements may have on corporate sales and profits." Brief for Arthur W. Page Soc'y et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)
(emphasis added).
85. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good CorporationsGo Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 773, 805-06 ("Few real people are as disconnected from social relationships as the
fiction that drives the share value maximization model.").
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In contrast, the management of for-profit corporations does not
have any other legitimate lens through which to assess these types of
question except as to how they stand to add or detract from economic
Other considerations, such as social
benefits to the firm. 6
responsibility may be taken into account to the extent that doing so
does not rise to the level of a breach of duty to shareholders, but that
does not mean such concerns are central to the firm's reason for
existence or are mandatory subjects of directors' duties. Concerns
for "stakeholders" are permissive, not mandatory, and case law
which approved spending corporate funds on charitable and political
concerns developed around a practice of deferring to the board's
judgment about what was in the company's long term interest.
Donation to social welfare in the form of charitable contributions or
other expenditures with no obvious business purpose are actually
justified as an exercise of business judgment, and thus authorized by
the business judgment rule, because such expenditures are thought to
promote the business but generating goodwill and burnishing the
company's image. While concern for economic benefits is by no
means an illegitimate concern, indeed care for the maximization of
economic welfare is often a positive good, it hardly seems that some
of the world's largest economic institutions can seriously claim they
require a constitutional shield for statements made in furtherance of
those interests. This is particularly so given that the corporate
structure often offers access to greater resources for expression,
greater access to the largest communication networks, and the
opportunity to use corporate monies to fund this expression, than is
available to the public at large. Moreover, all of these factors (and
perhaps others) mean the cultural environment is already heavily
skewed in favor of the speech of commercial interests. This results
in a situation where "matters of public concern" are increasingly
focused on the problems and views of commercial interests rather
than a wider range of matters of human concern.87
This raises the third structural problem-that the corporation is a
legal fiction, not a human being. A corporation has no individual
corporeal existence. It is not a human being who dies, suffers, or
86. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why CorporateSpeech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA
L. REV. 995, 1033 (1998).
87. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Age of Aquarius or, How I (Almost) Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love Free Markets, 88 MINN. L. REV. 921, 930-32 (2003).
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feels pain or joy. This means it has no expressive interests of its
own. And it also means that the sanctions of the criminal law, to the
extent that they are directed as human concerns like liberty, are less

effective."

First, the dispersal of authority often make assigning

fault to it difficult. Second, where there is no human being to punish
with the singular sanction that the criminal law has to offer, loss of

liberty, we can expect that, at least as a theoretical matter, the
effectiveness of the criminal law as a deterrent will be diminished. 9
A corporation cannot be thrown in jail.9" Third, even when the law

exacts criminal penalties against a corporation, it is unclear that the
punishment falls on the appropriate party.9

If the corporation goes

out of business a disproportionate amount of the resulting suffering
falls on employees, creditors, and shareholders who were not directly

responsible for any wrongdoing. There is no thing to suffer the
punishment. Punishment is always displaced. (Of course the same
observation might be made of civil fines-who is punished if the
cost of the fine is simply passed through the corporation?) Thus, the

corporate person is a person somewhat92 insensitive to sanctions of
any kind, whether criminal or civil.93 For all of these reasons, with
respect to truth, not only can we predict that market failures would
88. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 103 (2001).
89. See, e.g., Stacey Neumann Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and
the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 459, 487 (2004) (describing
the difficulties of assigning mens rea where responsibility is diffused); see also HARRY
GLASBEEK, WEALTH BY STEALTH: CORPORATE CRIME, CORPORATE LAW, AND THE
PERVERSION OF DEMOCRACY 118-43 (2002).
90. TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE
DISABILITY OF DEMOCRACY 5 (2003) ("As Baron Thurlow said some three centuries ago, 'Did
you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no
body to be kicked?"'); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If Only I Had a
Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a CorporateMorality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1655 (2002).
91. For instance, when a corporation goes out of business its employees lose their jobs and
sometimes their pensions as well, regardless of their personal involvement in the criminal
behavior. To those affected by such loses the punishment may be a far more dire than that of
even a very large fine.
92. The key word here is "somewhat." I am not suggesting that fines and other criminal
sanctions have no effect. And presumably the officers and directors of a corporation have the
same disinclination to suffer the social stigma of the perception of wrong doing, not to mention
the possibility of being charged personally and going to jail, in their professional context and
anyone does with respect to their status as citizens.
93. One observer has suggested that, pursuant to the criteria of the Diagnosticand Statistical
Manual IV for the diagnosis of mental illness, the corporate "person" is a psychopath. JOEL
BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 56-59
(2004).
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persist under a framework of broader protection for commercial
speech, they might positively flourish.
B. Market Failures

Economists generally use the term "market failure" to describe
conditions where the operation of the market fails to produce optimal
(i.e., "efficient") distributions of goods, services, or outcomes.94
Although economists differ on the definition of market failures and
how to determine when one has occurred, for purposes of this article
I define market failures as those occasions when the current market
fails to produce what may be fairly described as truth (or choice in
contexts where truth seem inapplicable) where the public welfare
would seem to require truth. These market failures occur in four
instances: (1) falsehoods perpetuated and disseminated to the
detriment of public welfare; (2) suppression of truthful information
that may benefit the public; (3) failures in the production of truthful
information; and (4) private (non-governmental) suppression of
freedom of expression or choice.95
Additional problems may result from the dominance of the
market metaphor itself because treating expression as a sellable
product refracts all social aims through the lens of the market,
something many find independently objectionable to the extent that
they feel some values transcend assessment in material terms.96
94. Market failures are typically caused by departures from the assumption of perfect
competition. For example, transaction costs, barriers to entry, distortions due to monopoly
power, free rider problems, and externalities can all result in market failures. See, e.g., Bush,
supra note 32, at 1114-20.
95. These are tentative categories and perhaps a more detailed inquiry will suggest they
should be collapsed. However, they are at least a sketch of the principal problems. I include
suppression of freedom of choice because sometimes one encounters the argument that the
existence of a thing is itself a truth. Suppression of its existence would be suppression of a truth
of a sort, even if the truth of the thing is relatively trivial, for instance, the existence or nonexistence of a perfume associated with Britney Spears. Whether its production or existence is a
good or bad thing is beyond the scope of this article. But it typically seems to be an article of
faith that more choice, without regard to its substance, is prima facie a normative good on the
grounds that any other conclusion is the paternalistic substitution of one person's (or group of
persons') idiosyncratic preferences for another's. For an argument to the contrary see BARRY
SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004).
96. There is a wealth of writing on this topic with fairly polarized views between those who
celebrate the consumer culture and those who view it as a negative development of the twentieth
century. Compare TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 1 (1998) ("The
capitalist market economy is a vital but underappreciated institutional framework .. "), and
JAMES B. TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA: THE TRIUMPH OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICAN CULTURE 4
(1996) ("In giving value to objects, advertising gives value to our lives."), with JEAN KILBOURNE,
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Others object to efforts they deem manipulative as interference with
autonomy. For example, there is an enormous amount of time and
money spent on psycho-social-neurological research with the aim of
learning how to better manipulate consumers. Much of this research
The perpetual bombardment of
lacks meaningful oversight.97
consumerist messages also intersects in complex ways with issues of
race and gender. Although all these problems merit further attention,
they are beyond the scope of this article.98 This article is limited to a
discussion of the above four categories which, perhaps the exception
of the limitations on choice category, most would agree represent
some species of market failure as to the production of truth in the
marketplace of ideas. Virtually everyone wants fewer falsehoods,
more reliable information, more production of reliable information,
and (usually) more choice. The following is a brief overview of
some evidence that suggests the market is yielding less of the last
three categories and more of the first than is optimal.

CAN'T BUY MY LOVE: How ADVERTISING CHANGES THE WAY WE THINK AND FEEL 45 (1999)

("[C]ommercial persuasion . . . promotes beliefs and behavior that have significant and
sometimes harmful effects on the individual, the family, the society, and the environment."),
NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO (1999), KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: THE UNCOOLING OF AMERICATM
201 (2000) ("Never-ending material growth is the cornerstone of our current economic
system.... And yet, constant growth within finite terrain is the ideology of the cancer cell."),
VINCENT J. MILLER, CONSUMING RELIGION: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND PRACTICE INA CONSUMER
CULTURE 225 (2005) ("Consumer culture is a profound problem for contemporary religious
belief and practice."), and JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO BUY: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD AND
THE NEW CONSUMER CULTURE 17 (2004) (arguing that commercialization of children, induced
by increasing commercial advertising that targets children, puts their emotional and psychological
well-being at risk).
97. It is not clear that the vast majority of marketing research, which takes place in focus
groups, surveys, questionnaires, and the like, is subject to much regulatory oversight. This is only
a problem of course if you feel regulation is beneficial. However, the lack of oversight presents a
curious contrast with generally prevailing attitudes towards university and medical research
involving human subjects. For a discussion regarding the ethics of research on human subjects,
see CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS 161-68 (2005) (describing research not regulated by federal law and not concerning an
FDA regulated matter, which is conducted at an institution either receiving federal funds or
agreeing to comply with the common rule). For a discussion of the way in which a great deal of
market research relies on data collected by the government, see Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Culde-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853,
857-58 (2002).
98. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implicationsfor Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 377 (2001).
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1. Falsehood
It is axiomatic that the First Amendment is not a license to
commit fraud. In addition, at least with respect to the commercial
speech doctrine, a key element for both extending protection to
speech and justifying its regulation is the degree to which reliable
information is crucial to proper market functioning. In the landmark
9 9 case, the Supreme Court held that the public's
Virginia Pharmacy
interest in the "free flow of commercial information"' ' ° justified
This holding
extending some protection to commercial speech.'
seemed influenced by Professor Martin Redish's assertion that
"[i]nformation received in the commercial context ... is specifically
designed to assist the individual in the decision-making process."10 2
Information, the Court concluded, was necessary for the proper
operation of the economy.0 3 This view conformed to the theoretical
understanding in economics of optimal market function. Perfect
knowledge "is assumed as a condition of the optimal operation of the
market."'"
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.0 5
The Court concluded that it was unduly "paternalistic" to assume that
people needed to be protected from the truth.0 6 The Court did not,
however, conclude that this "free flow" of information required quite
99. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
100. Id. at 765.
101. The term "commercial" continues to elude satisfactory definition. See Weinstein, supra
note 33; and Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 71.
102. See Martin H. Redish, supra note 15, at 445. In fact, he also convincingly folds selfgovernment into self-actualization claiming that Emerson's third value is really just a
manifestation of the first value. Id. at 439.
103. For a discussion of the arguments that advertising is economically efficient, see
Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue,
1990 DUKE L.J. 321.
104. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 20.
105. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
106. Id. at 770 ("[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and.., the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them.").
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the degree of governmental laissez-faire available to political or
expressive speech under the traditional First Amendment analysis.
To the contrary, the Court observed that "[t]he FirstAmendment...
does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of
commercial informationflow cleanly as well asfreely."'0 7
This is easier said than done because regulation is not cost-free.
The market model assumes perfect information and no transaction
costs. But in the real world there are transaction costs associated
with acquiring and producing information as well as with its
production. Where the costs to eliminate fraud would be higher than
the expected benefits of a fraud-free environment it would be rational
for the government to opt not to regulate. Thus, there may be some
optimal amount of fraud.'
But the decision that regulation in a
particular context is more costly than attempting to eliminate all
market imperfections is not the same thing as concluding that what
the market produces is optimal truth.
Given imperfect information and the existence of transaction
costs, much of the dilemma with commercial speech and the
regulation of commerce has been how to achieve the closest
approximation possible to the condition of complete information that
would obtain in a perfect market (and seems necessary to it), without
incurring the excessive costs arising from over-regulation. It is
important to find this balance because, "[flor markets to operate
effectively, buyers must have accurate information about the quality
and other characteristics of the products offered for sale. Otherwise
there can be no basis for confidence that the market will enable
consumers to make purchases maximizing their welfare within the
limitations of their resources."'0 9
Two general assumptions guide these efforts: fraud is bad and
ought to be discouraged and information is good and ought to be

107. Id. at 771-72 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the reasons why the Court thought
commercial speech could be more safely regulated for its truth than other types of protected
speech, see id. at 772 n.24 (noting that the "hardiness" of commercial speech, the speaker's
ability to verify the facts, and the need to prevent deception justify imposing the burden of
truthfulness on the speaker).
108. See generally Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal
Amount ofFraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1973).
109. RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 3 (1973) (emphasis

added).
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cultivated."' The question is: who is to cultivate it? Although the
market model assumes perfect knowledge as a condition, it does not
suggest that perfect knowledge is a consequence of the operation of
the market."' In reality, there are transaction costs associated with
acquiring knowledge. All other things being equal, listeners need a
way to distinguish false speech from true speech in order for the
market to produce maximum truth. "If hearers cannot distinguish
truths from falsehoods, speakers of truth will not be able to command
higher prices for them, and, hence, the market for speech will not
have the optimal properties it would have under perfect
information.""' In the absence of perfect information, governmental
attempts to improve the quality of information in the market can
hardly be deemed paternalistic when it comes to false speech. What
is a little more troublesome is the protection offered to true
commercial speech. If "commercial speech" equals "advertising" it
is not clear that what it is protecting is truth, even if, strictly
speaking, it isn't falsity either.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court did not attempt to define what
made speech commercial, but it seemed to use the term "advertising"
interchangeably with the term "commercial speech." Even though
the Court offered commercial speech protection for its informational
value, one would be hard-pressed to identify much "information" in
the vast majority of commercial advertising." 3 As Professor Martin
Redish noted in 1971, even "[a] cursory examination of current
television and periodical advertising reveals that in practice,
comparatively little commercial promotion performs . . . a purely
informational function.""' 4 It might be fair to say that this is even
truer today than it was in 1971. Currently, there is not much
information and a lot of false advertising out there. This is true even
when you do not count as false advertising which is deceptive insofar
as it creates (or attempts to create) irrational associations such as the
belief that using a certain brand of toothpaste will make you popular,
110. Id.
111. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 20.
112. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 21.
113. Similar to the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech, the attempt
to define "information" is a difficult proposition because marketing is information in the form of
brand identities and images that will resonate with the potential consumer, and the lines between
advertising and entertainment are blurred.
114. Redish, supra note 15, at 433.
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or that smoking a particular brand of cigarettes will make you
liberated. While this sort of deception, as well as "puffing,""' 5 has
been the subject of much discussion,"'6 it is beyond the scope of this
article." 7 This article offers only a quick impressionistic sketch of
the sort of falsehoods that are rather straightforwardly capable of
being identified as such. And even so limited, our culture appears
awash with such claims. The four statements mentioned in the
beginning of this article are merely a sample of what appears to be
the ubiquitous practice of making false or misleading claims in a
commercial context. Any general circulation magazine is bound to
contain numerous claims which seem false on their face, claims such
as those found in ads touting diet pills (Eat all you want and Lose
Weight!), sexual aids (Recover Potency!), marital aids (Have the
Best Sex Ever!), exercise equipment (Six Pack Abs in Six Weeks!),
and any number of dietary supplements (Have More Energy! Get a
Good Night's Sleep!).
115. See, e.g., In re Gen, Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brakes Prod. Liab. Litig., 966 F. Supp.
1525, 1531 (E.D. Mo. 1997), aff'd 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that General Motors'
claim that its ABS was 99% more effective than other protective systems such as airbags was not
actionable, but rather mere puffing that "a consumer [would not] reasonably believe" was
supported by test data).
116. Ads may be subtly deceptive or emotionally manipulative because they do not rely on
direct appeals to rationality, Sarah C. Haan, The "PersuasionRoute" of the Law: Advertising and
Legal Persuasion, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2000) (arguing that persuasion is not solely a
matter of rational appeal), and claims may be exaggerated pursuant to the puffing doctrine. There
is some evidence that many in the marketing field believe that the facts are only loosely tethered,
if at all, to appeals in advertising and marketing. See, e.g., Seth Godin, The Storytellers, CMO
MAG., June 2005, at I ("The facts are irrelevant. In the short run, it doesn't matter one bit
whether something is actually better or faster or more efficient. What matters is what the
consumer believes."); see also Lew McCreary, Lies, Damn Lies and Puffery, CMO MAG., July
2005.
117. This article does not address the more inchoate value to consumers of the information
contained in the form of trademarks, patents, and brands. In fact, the value of such information is
more tangible to the seller than to the consumer, where, for instance a generic brand is
indistinguishable in composition or effect from a name brand selling for a higher price. Early in
the 2 0 th century, sellers treated the investment in creating such distinctions in the consumers'
minds as potential economic waste because the distinction could not be tied back to a substantive
difference. See JULES BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 28-34 (1967) (describing
previous assessment that advertising expenditures constituted "waste" and were anticompetitive
and arguing that, to the contrary, advertising performs an important role in the economy and
delivers information to consumers). Later, courts accepted businesses' judgment that brand
identification and loyalty were valuable insofar as they helped reduce search costs for consumers
and so were not wasteful, even though the only discernable difference between the house brand
and the national brand was the companies' respective advertising budgets. See, e.g., FTC v.
Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948) (arguing that brands lower transaction
costs like search costs).
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Print ads in magazines represent only one small slice of the
range of marketing efforts where false claims may be made. It does
not capture false or misleading statements made in any other
media-for example, television or radio. And false or misleading
statements are made in other many contexts other than overt
advertising pitches. Take the example of what later became known
as Enron's Potemkin village. Enron managers, in an attempt to sell
analysts on the company's stock, took them on a tour of a new
division called Enron Energy Services ("EES") that was supposed to
serve as a retail energy provider. They were shown to a room
purporting to be the headquarters for EES.
There, they beheld the very picture of a sophisticated,
booming business: a big open room, bustling with people,
all busily working the telephones and hunched over
computer terminals, seemingly cutting deals and trading
energy. Giant plasma screen displayed electronic maps,
which could show the sites of EES's many contracts and
prospects. Commodity prices danced across an electronic
ticker."'
One observer called it "impressive. . . a veritable beehive of
activity."" 9 However, the whole thing was a sham. The entire room
was set up to make analysts think that EES was farther along than it
was. 120 What is particularly striking about this is that Enron's
management seemed to feel that this exercise was nothing more than
the sort of permissible spin or puffery that is an inextricable part of
the current business environment and that it was permissible because
they intended to establish such a center in the future. If it would be
true that EES would have such a command center at some future
point, it would not be lying to pretend it was already established. It
would simply be a preview. As we now know, the market eventually
corrected for the Enron misstatements, although at great cost to
investors, employees, and the economy as a whole. But does it seem
likely that a First Amendment defense for promotional speech would
enhance the chances of the occurrence of this market correction? To
the contrary, it seems far more likely to insulate such incidents from
118. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND THE SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON, 179-80 (Penguin Books 2004).

119. Id. at 180.
120. Id.

210
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providing a basis for criminal or civil liability if defendants may
assert a First Amendment defense to their promotional activities.
2. Suppression of Truth
The market may indeed sometimes expose misstatements
without any help from governmental intervention because, according
to Judge Richard Posner, there is a market for truth. "Being profitdriven, the media respond to the actual demands of their audience
rather than to the idealized 'thirst for knowledge' demand posited by
public intellectuals and deans of journalism schools.' 2' Fortunately,
for those who are interested in the truth (even if not quite a "thirst for
knowledge"), there is "a market demand for correcting the errors and
ferreting out the misdeeds of one's enemies .... 22 In other words,
we can expect the market to eventually correct for falsehoods
because someone, somewhere is interested in exposing the
falsehoods of others.2 3
However, as previously noted, this
proposition is demonstrably false in many those cases where there is
no other "side" that has the same resources and/or motivations to
offer counter speech. 1 4 Even where there is another side it may have
difficulty getting the mainstream media to carry its message since
private media have no obligation to carry any particular
communication. Yet, the argument that an open market is selfcorrecting is the basis for claiming that a failure to apply the same
broadly protective First Amendment standards to Nike's speech as is
applied to the speech of its critics represents suppression of one
"side.' 25
It does not seem obvious that society should put so much faith in
the media, or an entity's competitor, for the exposure of untruths. As
previously discussed, media are often subject to enormous pressures
121. Richard A. Posner, BadNews, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 31, 2005, at 9. Notice how
Posner fudges the question of whether what the market demands is the truth. How is that
ordinary truth that the market will presumably produce different from the impliedly elite "thirst
for knowledge"? To be fair, he was speaking specifically about journalism which is only one
source of information, and so perhaps that accounts for the distinction.
122. Id. at9-10.
123. Id. For a contrary view on the reliability of the market to provide adequate information,
see Charles Lewis, The Nonprofit Road, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 33-34
(arguing that market forces are inadequate to provide sufficient coverage of news and issues and
that a nonprofit organizational structure may be necessary to sustain journalistic quality).
124. See, e.g., Goldman & Cox, note 29, at 27.
125. See, e.g., Johnson & Fisher, supra note 83, at 1254.
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from advertisers with respect to content, pressures that make them
unreliable watchdogs.'26 And if every firm in the market is engaging
in similar behavior, the incentives for exposing that behavior in
Moreover, whether or not these
others is perhaps reduced.
motivations are adequate for exposing untruths, the same
mechanisms, such as dependence by media on advertising, can lead
to suppression of truth where truthful information might hurt a firm's
economic interests. The health risks associated with smoking
cigarettes is the most notorious example of this problem.
Presumably the same problem arises with products like pesticides,
drugs, food, and other products that might cause rather direct harms.
If no entity has an economic interest in producing information about
the harms associated with a particular product or process, it is not
clear why we should be confident that it will invariably be produced.
It is difficult to draw a clear line between the dissemination of a
false statement and the suppression of truthful information because
the dissemination of a false statement often represents the
suppression of the opposite truthful information.'27 To say, for
example, "cigarettes do not contain carcinogenic materials" when
they in fact do is to simultaneously promote a falsehood and to
repress its opposite, the information that cigarettes do contain
carcinogens. Suppression of truthful information like this is most
troubling when the speaker possesses all or most of the information
on a subject. For example, in the case of a new drug, presumably the
company which developed it may be the only entity to have negative
information about the product prior to its release or approval by the
126. When the media take public relations press releases from commercial entities and
presents them as news without attribution to the source, they are not only not acting as
watchdogs, they are part of the problem. See, e.g., Trudy Lieberman, The Epidemic, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 38-43, ("Phony medical news is on the rise, thanks to
dozens of unhealthy deals between TV newsrooms and hospitals."); see also C. EDWIN BAKER,
ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994). For a discussion of the role played by mergers
and the diminishing number of firms in the communication and media business, see C. EDWIN
BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS (2007);
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY (1999).

127. In some cases it is not clear whether speech constitutes truth, falsehood, or an
obfuscation of the truth, such as where a drug is marketed for an off-label, unapproved use. One
drug, Neurontin, was approved for use in the treatment of epilepsy, but not approved for uses
such as treating migraine headaches, social phobias, diabetic neuralgia, spinal cord injury, and a
host of other aliments. When Warner-Lambert executed a marketing plan specifically setting
goals for increasing prescriptions for off-label uses it ran afoul of the FDA and the company pled
guilty to criminal charges. See Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213 (N.D. Ala.
2006).
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FDA. 28 Nevertheless, there may be a difference of degree, if not in
kind, between the following: a knowing falsehood, the failure to
disclose negative information where it is known, and the active
engagement in strategies to suppress, obfuscate, or make information
more difficult to obtain, even if all three strategies may be employed
with respect to a particular product. This section focuses on the last
two strategies.
The civil and criminal penalties for fraud are part of a legal
strategy to impose costs on fraud that will make engaging in it less
profitable and thus discourage its production. Judging from what
appears to be the ubiquitous nature of fraud, it is unclear whether the
various existing penalties have achieved anything close to an optimal
correction for the market failure of fraud. At least there are some
penalties for fraud. In contrast to affirmative misstatements, the law
has not always required a seller to disclose flaws or shortcomings in
the product. Rather, caveat emptor was, and in many cases remains,
the default rule. The establishment of affirmative legal duties to
disclose negative information in areas like consumer protection and
securities2 9 seems to be the only corrective to market incentives not
to disclose. 3 ° Broad First Amendment protection for commercial
speech might imperil some of these disclosure rules.
There is no basis for concluding that a for-profit corporation will
ever disseminate unfavorable information except under compulsion
or in the most enlightened assessments of its long-term interests
where the corporation can expect the information will eventually
come to light.' 3 ' Even though the members of boards of directors
128. See WASHBURN, supra note 39, at 113-16 (describing suppression of adverse events in
clinical studies on the use of SSRI anti-depressants for adolescent depression).
129. See, e.g., Leigh Johnson, Jane Jeffries Jones & Diane J. Fuchs, PreparingProxy
Statements Under the SEC's New Rules Regarding Executive and Director Compensation
Disclosures, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 373 (2007) (covering disclosure requirements in securities
laws); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 903 (2007)
(discussing the Truth in Lending law and observing that disclosures are a common feature of
consumer protection law).
130. There is a separate issue about whether disclosures are always effective and thus may be
a fairly weak corrective device. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:
Misrepresentationand Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 58384 (2006) (discussing the evidence that some disclosures actually reduce consumer understanding
of truthful information).
131. There is some evidence that even under compulsion corporations will not disclose
negative information. For example, Judge Kessler in the District Court for the District of
Columbia assessed a $2.75 million fine on Philip Morris for failure to comply with a court order
with respect to discovery. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26
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have probably just as much interest as anyone in not seeing negative
information circulated about themselves or their company, they have
an additional incentive to withhold disclosure of negative
information. Given that officers and directors have a fiduciary duty
to shareholders, arguably they may have a duty to suppress negative
information as long as it is legal to do so (i.e., there is no legal
requirement of disclosure) where that information will predictably
have negative consequences on the bottom line. Disclosure rules are
intended to create an incentive to disclose information where one
otherwise does not exist. For example, with respect to prescription
drugs, some argue that researchers need to disclose funding from
pharmaceutical companies because without these disclosures the
Obvious cases in
outcomes of such research might be overvalued.'
this category are adverse incidents related to drugs such as Vioxx"'
or defective products in general. 3 '
(D.D.C. 2004). Destruction of documents which might arguably contain negative information
about Enron was a key aspect of the criminal charges against Enron's accounting firm, Arthur
Anderson, although the verdict was later reversed on the grounds that the jury instructions were
misleading. See Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705-06 (2005)
(overturning the conviction because the jury instruction failed to adequately convey the
requirement of intent to the jury). Of course one could say that this failure to disclose was no
more a feature of its corporate status than a similar failure by any individual. So it didn't fail to
disclose because it was a corporation. However, for the reasons I outlined in the previous section
on incentives, I believe corporate law actually constructs positive moral incentives for behavior
that in other contexts an actor might think was improper, but reframed as a duty to shareholders
seems acceptable, particularly where it is not specifically forbidden. Moreover, as discussed
above, the dispersal of tasks amongst many persons, each of whom may only have a part, a part
that seems less clearly problematic, similarly makes antisocial behavior harder to identify and
thus harder to punish, with, presumably for those retributivists out there, a corresponding
decrease in incentives to either investigate or refrain since chances of being caught are low. Add
into this mix the hierarchy which offers some people the opportunity to claim they are merely
following the orders of their superiors and it seems there is a robust structure of incentives in
addition to whatever cupidity might encourage in individual circumstances.
132. See, e.g., Amy Rainey, Study Says 'DSM' Lacks Transparency, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC.,May 5, 2006, at A22 (reporting on a study claiming many of the contributors to the latest
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-V have "undisclosed
financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry").
133. Vioxx is one of the most well known but is by no means the only one. Henry A.
Waxman, The Lessons of Vioxx-Drug Safety and Sales, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 25, 2576-78
(2005).
134. Products liability is an entire area of law devoted to securing redress for consumers for
injuries caused by defective products. Most disturbingly, a company may predicate its decision to
market a product on the economic comparison between expected liabilities and expected sales.
Under this approach, if sales exceed potential liability, the company may decide to go forward
with manufacturing and production despite known risks. Cigarettes are the most notorious
example, and similar examples are the Ford Pinto and Firestone tires. In many of these cases,
internal documents uncovered that a company knew the risks of a product, but suppressed the
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The most difficult case in truth suppression may be the last
category, that is, where a for-profit company engages in speech not
to add to available information, but to create confusion and doubt
about the truth of a particular claim. This sort of effort typically
takes place through public relations efforts and may be characterized
as "spin" that is not demonstrably false, but which is disseminated
with the intention of promoting false impressions or actively
obscuring the truth.'35 The tobacco industry's efforts to create doubt
about the negative health consequences of smoking present a
paradigmatic case of this sort of market failure. The tobacco
industry funded front groups, such as the Center for Tobacco
Research, to publish "research" and issued reports on this research
intended to create uncertainty over the negative health effects of
smoking where, increasingly, there was no uncertainty existed in the
scientific community.' 36
As industry critics Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber have
observed, this tactic is a familiar one in public relations and has been
applied to a number of industrial hazards: (1) the Air Hygiene
Foundation and Silica Safety Associations formed to dispute that
exposure to silica caused silicosis;'3 7 (2) the American Petroleum
Institute's Medical Advisory Committee mobilized to dispute that
exposure to benzene caused cancer; 38 and (3) API's Medical
Advisory Committee and Industrial Hygiene Foundation formed to
dispute asbestos' link to asbestosis. 39 Today, it is generally
undisputed that all these substances represent health hazards. The
list of toxic chemicals with negative effects on workers and
consumers health that were not fully appreciated at the time the
chemicals were first produced is distressingly long. In addition to
the above mentioned hazards, the list includes DDT, PCBs, vinyl
information. Of course it is probably true that no product is risk-free and so the decision to make
anything is taken on this basis.
135. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Tamara R. Piety, FreeAdvertising: The
Casefor Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 367 (2006).
136. See First Amended Complaint, United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp.
2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 99-02496); see also Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids,
Tobacco Companies Found Guilty of Massive Wrongdoing but Remedies Fail to Protect
American People and Must Be Appealed (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/script/
DisplayPressRelease.php3?Display=937.
137. RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 23, at 75-98 (2001).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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chloride, lead, and numerous others. In many cases, the industry in
question may have been aware of the dangers associated with these
substances long before the dangers became widely known. If so,
efforts to convince the public that these substances did not represent
a risk to public health seem to represent a market failure in the
market for truth.
The sorts of efforts at obfuscation through the use of front
groups have not been limited to misdirection about the effects of
toxic chemicals. Similar efforts have contributed to the public
perception of value in the shares of companies such as Enron where
public relations spin helped to create the impression of value where
(arguably) none existed. 4 ' Similarly, many have charged the oil
companies have pursued a strategy of sowing doubt about the
evidence of global climate change which was modeled on the
tobacco industry's efforts to deny the health risks of smoking,
although with perhaps more devastating consequences since global
climate change affect everyone on the planet. 4 '
3. Failure in the Production of Information
Money and access to money are often linked to the production
of speech. It takes money to finance a movie, to test a drug and
publish the results, to publish a book, and to produce and air a
140. An enormous amount has been written about the collapse of Enron and similar failures.
A good collection of articles can be found in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). Enron was one of the most
well-publicized spectacular business failures in recent years arising from fraudulent accounting.
The Saturday, June 11, 2005 issue of The New York Times carried at least five stories related to
corporate misconduct. See A Second Guilty Plea in A.I.G.-Related Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2005, at C13; Ken Belson, Ebbers Pleadsfor Leniency in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005,
at C 13; Julie Creswell, CitigroupAgrees to Pay $2 Billion in Enron Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2005, at Al; Jurors in Trial of Two Tyco Executives End the Week Without Completing a
Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at C2.
141. In September of 2006 The Economist devoted a special section of its magazine to climate
change. A subtitle for one article was, "Global warming, it now seems, is for real." Emma
Duncan, The Heat Is On, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 3-6 (emphasis added). A reasonable
question could be, why use the phrase "it now seems"? what took so long? Perhaps it was the
years of industry-sponsored research purporting to dispute the scientific consensus? See Press
Release, Ayn Rand Inst., Senators' Letter is a Violation of Exxon Mobil's Freedom of Speech
(Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=13691 (discussing a
letter from Senators Rockefeller and Snowe comparing the techniques of dispute creation on the
issue of climate change to the tobacco industry's creation of a false "debate" over the issue of
smoking); see also Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Scenes From the Climate
Inquisition: The Chilling Effect of the Global Warming Consensus, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 19,
2007, at 26, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/
275tmktp/asp. The cost of delay in recognizing the reality of climate change is still unclear.
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commercial, documentary, or television show. So at the outset we
can assume that some truth may fail to be produced if it lacks
funding. And while we might deplore the low quality of some
entertainment produced through this system, particularly with respect
to goods like children's educational television programming,14 1 this is
a concern with perhaps more direct negative consequences when it
comes to issues like drug research.143 Daniel Carlat, a professor at
Tufts Medical School, has argued that there is a lack of "high quality
research data" on the efficacy of generic drugs in some areas because
most research into the efficacy of drugs is conducted by
pharmaceutical companies, and with the financial incentive of
patents these companies will not perform this research, even if it is
44

socially useful. 1

For example, according to Dr. Carlat, the drug Trazodone is
much cheaper than either Ambien or Lunesta, two prescription sleep
aids. 45 Although it might be useful to follow up on preliminary
studies that suggest Trazodone is valuable as a sleep aid in order to
offer the public a cheaper alternative to Ambien and Lunesta, such
research is unlikely to be conducted without funding. And funding
may not be forthcoming where there is little or no prospect of
generating the exclusive, intellectual property rights deemed
necessary to recoup the costs of investing in the research.
Intellectual property regimes may thus drive failures to produce
information as well as offering incentives for its production in other
142. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters,Bureaucrats,and Children's
Television Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1246-47 (1996) (arguing that "the market has
plainly failed to provide [children's educational programming] on a consistent basis" and the First
Amendment claims of broadcasters in opposition to proposals to mandate more of it have been
"vastly overstated").
143. See, e.g., JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2004) (identifying some of those costs as inadequate information about
risks because of incentives structures that favor expenditures in marketing rather than the
collection of post-marketing data and which may reward suppression of negative information);
Susan Haack, Scientific Secrecy and "Spin ": The Sad Sleazy Saga of the Trials of Remune, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 63 (2006) ("Entanglement with business interests undoubtedly
poses a threat to the scientific ethos, and, in consequence, to the advancement of science.").
144. Daniel Carlat, Generic Smear Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at A27. Dr. Carlat
also charges that the manufacturers of these drugs have sponsored research that "can only be
described as trazodone-bashing" and is unwarranted by trazodone's safety record. Assuming the
shortcomings of trazodone supposedly revealed by the research Carlat alludes to are fabricated or
misleading, this example may fall into the first market failure category-falsehoods perpetuated
and disseminated to the detriment of public welfare.
145. Id.
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cases.146 Presumably, these are losses of truth which we are prepared
to suffer without regard to free competition in the marketplace of
ideas.' 47
4. Other Market Failures-Suppression of Choice
In addition to the market failures with respect to truth, its
expression, suppression, and production, another sort of failure
occurs when the market fails to provide an adequate array of choices,
(assuming that maximizing choice is a generally agreed upon
good).'4 8 One of the supposed advantages of a free market is the
greater array of choices in a market system that caters to the variety
of consumer desires. This is often set in contrast to a planned
economy which only offers government-approved goods. Wendy's
famous "Soviet fashion show" ad, to note only one example,
promoted this notion of a wide variety of choices as a positive
thing.'4 9 The ad is a fashion show in which all of the categoriesdaywear, evening wear, and swimwear-feature the same woman in
the same grey dress. The tag line is that at Wendy's, not all burgers
In other words, Wendy's offered
were "dressed the same."
consumers a choice. The implication is that this is good thing. And
although it is true that a market system often rushes to provide
consumers with the goods that they want, it is also sometimes the
case that it rushes to convince the consumer to want what it has to
offer. And that is not always the widest choice as theoretically
possible. In many cases the market suppresses choice, including
expression.

146. See, e.g., William A. Wines & Terence J. Lau, Can You Hear Me Now? Corporate
Censorship and Its Troubling Implicationsfor the First Amendment, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 119,
120-21, 167 (2005).
147. This is a far broader topic that can be covered here. However, there is a wealth of
commentary and criticism with respect to the ways in which intellectual property rules may
decrease the amount of speech, art, and other creative work produced. For somewhat polemic
arguments about the effects of intellectual property regimes, see DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME
BULLIES (2005); BRIAN MARTIN, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (1998).
148. Although our culture generally celebrates choice as an unquestioned good, philosophers
and psychologists have noted that sometimes choice can create distress. See, e.g., GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 62-81 (1988); BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004).
=
Wendy 's Soviet Fashion Show Ad, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
149. See
customization
own
its
advertised
King
Burger
5,
2007).
Oct
visited
(last
DWAKtYGJZSM
options with the similar injunction "have it your way."
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The notion that the government is the sole source of the
suppression of freedom, including limitation on choice, obscures the
ways private actors may also operate to limit consumer choice.
When the limitations are imposed by private, rather than
governmental entities, this may represent a different political issue,
and it may not be a First Amendment issue, but it is nevertheless a
real limitation with implications for the proposition that a free market
will maximize choices. Of course, the distinction between the
private and the public may not be easy to maintain given that it is the
public law that authorizes private property. The legal concept of
private property may operate to confer privilege and power in a way
that limits others' choices. 5 ' For example, owners of trademarks and
other intellectual property may suppress infringing uses pursuant to
the legal protection of commercial activities. 5 ' As Professor
Rebecca Tushnet has observed, "[t]here is no free speech right to use
another's property."' 52
Of course, the First Amendment is directed at limiting
governmental restrictions of speech. Private suppression of speech is
not, therefore, a First Amendment issue. However, if we recall, as
Hohfeld 53 suggested, private suppression is only made possible
through a legal regime created and enforced by govenmment'54 we
should perhaps not dismiss too readily even private suppression as
not implicating the First Amendment. A number of legal concepts in
private law chill the expression of self, choice, and options.'55

150. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 10-11 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 34 (1993)).
151. In many cases it may also arise from market power arising from few players, disparate
resources, and the ability to affect laws in their favor-these factors as well as others are typically
viewed as failures in perfect competition necessary for a fully free market.
152. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV.
737, 746 (2007).
153. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (David Campbell & Phillip A. Thomas eds., 2002) (discussing private
rights as legal entitlements backed up by the power of the state).
154. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32-44 (1913) (noting that a legal "liberty" inevitably gives
rise to a "privilege" to exercise that liberty, and therefore, legal liberties and privileges are
indistinguishable); cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 314 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding state action and violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the court's enforcement of a discriminatory restrictive covenant,
even though the covenant was solely defined between private parties to a private contract).
155. This section highlights the difficulty with these distinctions. Can it be said that a
particular suppression arises from the operation of the market (as distinct from the law) when the
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The most obvious suppression of expression, and thus choice of
what speech products to consume, arises from intellectual property,
copyright, and trademark. When a patent prevents the development
and/or sale of a generic form of a drug, this is a limitation on choice,
albeit perhaps a justifiable limitation. When copyright laws prevent
the use of copyrighted materials in some context in which the
material might otherwise be shown or disseminated, it prevents the
dissemination and availability of that material, or sometimes of new
material that might be made from bits of the original. This may or
may not be a good thing. Originality, to the extent that it exists, may
be a value worthy of protection as much as choice. However, the
protection of intellectual property suppresses some freedom of
expression.
Perhaps the second most notable exercise in suppression takes
place in the workplace. All over the country most employees are not
free to say whatever they like without fear of reprisal because the
employment-at-will doctrine extends to employers the right to
dismiss employees for any reason, including what might be
considered a "bad" reason, like self-expression."' One might find
this high level of speech suppression problematic if we assume there
is much truth being suppressed (quite apart from the independent
value of supporting self-expression). Whistleblowing might be one
such circumstance. "Multiple recent examples of corporate heads
who have failed to listen to dissenters and whistleblowers underscore
the costly and disastrous consequences [of suppressing dissent in the
workplace]."' 57 There is not a lot of evidence, however, that either in
the law or in society in general, there is much support for the
proposition that free expression in the workplace is a good thing. To
the contrary, there appears to be a fair amount of consensus that
suppression of self-expression in the workplace is a necessary traderights and privileges that may support some of this suppression arise in law and could be said to
be examples of imperfections in competition?
156. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND.
L.J. 101, 102 (1995); Richard Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First Amendment:
Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 734-35 (1989). See generally
LAWRENCE SOLEY, CENSORSHIP, INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO FREE SPEECH IN THE

UNITED STATES (2002) (discussing other ways that businesses censor speech in addition to the
employment context).
157. Nasrin Shahinpoor & Bernard F. Matt, The Power of One: Dissent and Organizational
Life, 74 J. Bus. ETHICS 37, 42 (2007).
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off for efficiency, if not desirable for its own sake. Some people
might prefer to be free from co-workers' self-expression for
example. Apart from the issue of whether this is a false dichotomy,
some may support such suppression by employers as socially
appropriate, that is, as a natural outgrowth of the enterprise
"belonging" to the employer.'58
There are few areas that encroach upon this discretion.
Discrimination is one. Whistleblower protection is another and
arguably the most uncontroversial one. since whistleblowers are
reporting violations of the law.
On its face, this seems
uncomplicated. Of course, in a legal environment where the legality
of so many actions may be open to dispute, it is perhaps not so
strange that concerns about deference to managers and economic
efficiency are persuasive counter-arguments to broader enforcement
of protections for whistleblowers.' 59 So in practice, these limitations
of employer freedom to suppress speech with which it disagrees have
been fairly narrow.
If suppression of absolute freedom of expression in the
workplace chills some expression, the suppression of this speech is
the result of a rather straightforward argument from efficiency. It is
not so clear that other sorts of information suppression or the
limitations of choices are a positive good. Consider the example of
alternatives to the internal combustion engine in automobiles. When
the manufacturers of electric cars engaged in public relations and
advertising campaigns to depress demand for electric cars and then
pulled all the models of electric cars in existence from the market
save those in museums, arguably this was not in the public's
interest. 6 ° It may not have even been in the long run interest of the
158. Whether this paradigm of the employer as a person who "owns" the enterprise is an apt
one in the case of public companies-where the owners are ostensibly the stockholders, who do
not have much proprietary interest in the day-to-day directing of the firm's business-is another
question.
159. For example, there is some evidence that the whistleblower protection provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley have not proven particularly effective.
Three years ago, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law and hailed as a safety net
for employees who stepped forward and revealed wrongdoing at their companies. But
of the hundreds of people who lost jobs and filed complaints since the act was passed,
only two are actually back at their jobs.
Jayne O'Donnell, Blowing the Whistle Can Lead to Harsh Aftermath, Despite Law, USA TODAY,
August 1, 2005, at lB.
160. WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR? (Sony Pictures Classics 2006).
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car manufacturers themselves to the extent that they may have placed
bad, long-run bets against the public's interest in electric cars. 6 '
It is just as difficult (if not impossible) to speculate on what is
not being produced in marketplace of ideas as it is to speculate on
what products are not being produced in general. But as with the
electric car, one has the sense that choices are sometimes limited in a
way to suit the demands of manufacturers and producers of products
rather than in response to an authentic demand. One example may
be the range of colors in which, from year to year, consumer
products are produced. Anyone who has ever become attached to a
particular color that has fallen out of favor, or who has noticed that
particular colors are suddenly popping up everywhere, is
experiencing one manifestation of this phenomenon. It is tempting
to think that the proliferation of a particular color, say avocado
green, is simply a reflection of consumer tastes. But it is not
anything so direct. IP fact, colors are researched and announced in
palettes and introduced in a way that obscures the concept of choice
and chooser.'62 If only lime green and sea foam green are available
when a consumer wants emerald green, and the colors are a function
of a choice made by manufacturers, advertisers, consultants, color
specialists, and others some years in advance so that nothing is
available in the color the consumer wants, did the consumer really
"chose" sea foam green when he would have preferred emerald
green? Do the choices of these experts inhibit the autonomy of the
individual by dictating the available palette?
Channeling consumer desires with respect to colors may be a
relatively trivial thing. Other examples of channeling and shaping
consumer choices are arguably less benign. For example, when
advertising of food, particularly cheap food, relentlessly promotes
161. This section does not defend either the decision to pull electric cars or the proposition
that pulling them was unwise, but rather suggests that the correct choice is unclear, even as a
business decision.
162. There is no "conspiracy" per se around color, but there is a powerful consortium of
industry researchers who put together color forecasts for marketing purposes. See Color
Marketing Group, http://www.colormarketing.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). The projections
appear to be a self-fulfilling prophecy to the extent that it is unclear whether the color palette
suggested would actually represent consumer preferences in the absence of widespread industry
adoption of the group's recommendations. The purpose of this effort is discussed in the
organization's publication, The Profit of Color! (note the play on words of "profit" and "prophet"
in which the point of the group is to predict color trends). Color Marketing Group, The Profit of
Color!, http://www.colormarketing.org (follow "The Profit of Color" hyperlink).
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high fat, high caloric, high salt foods, and healthier substitutes are
more expensive, harder to obtain, less convenient, less salient, and
less visible in the culture, this influences food choices in a way that
may not purely reflect the operation of the market or the autonomy of
the consumer. If it were the case that fresh vegetables, fruits, and
other unprocessed foods were similarly marketed and similarly
available, it might be that ultimately the consumer's choice would be
different.'63 The reasons for their unavailability are complicated and
may be related to the technology of mass production, preservation,
and transportation, rather than to any desire to promote fattening
products.
Presumably, all things being equal, the producers of these
products would be delighted if their product were non-fattening.
Nevertheless, the freedom of choice in an arena of limited options
and unequal promotion may be a matter of concern when those
choices have negative health consequences such as heart disease or
obesity. This is not to say we should institute a regime of
paternalistic interference in people's food choices by outlawing fast
food. However, it seems unrealistic to represent the relentless
promotion of these products as the neutral promotion of options for
consumers in the face of the health consequences, given uneven
economic incentives for the promotion of competing food choices,
and in conjunction with the ambiguity of what constitutes choice
where the chooser's choices are channeled and limited at the outset.
Similarly, permitting direct-to-consumer advertising of the drugs
themselves, instead of simply the price of drugs, as was at issue in
Virginia Pharmacy, seems to go beyond anti-paternalistic desires to
provide consumers with "information." To the contrary, the "sell"
message is often not very informational. Rather it is vivid, colorful
and laden with emotional appeals to "take control" and "enjoy life."
In contrast, the portion of these ads which contain (arguably) the
most information, the portion relating to side effects, warnings and
contraindications, is conveyed in a manner that seems calculated to
have potential consumers skip it. The information is in black and
163. In response to vocal criticism of marketing practices targeting children as consumers of
sugary foods, Kellogg's and other cereal companies are adopting voluntary guidelines on both the
manufacturing and the advertising fronts to produce healthier cereals and to stop marketing those
brands that don't meet announced nutritional standards to children in an attempt to avoid
governmental regulation.
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white dense blocks of text which, much like lending disclosures,
warranties, and similar information is designed to encourage a
consumer to disregard it. Such language is seldom actually read.
Using persuasive presentation techniques like pictures and vague ad
copy that appeal to emotional motivations, when these same
techniques are not used to convey the warnings substantially skews
and channels choices in a way that may be counter to the public
interest. Consider for a moment that if the warnings contained on
labels on cigarettes needed to be conveyed with the same vividness
and salience as the sales portion,"6 whether those warnings might not
be more effective.
II. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas," while
illuminating some issues, is inadequate to the task of articulating
appropriate boundaries for the regulation of commercial speech, even
on its own terms. It runs the risk of failing to capture, or perhaps
even fundamentally transforming, important values that may not
survive the translation to a market analogy.
The view that the good life is a life of the gratification of
desire, without critical attention to the nature of the desire
in question or to the nature of the proposed gratification-a
life of consumption-is simply not an adequate conception
of human felicity or an adequate image of the meaning of
human experience. Our habituation to the forces in our
culture that promote this view, in the economic and political
arenas alike, makes it difficult for us to defend our most
important institutions and values, those that imply and
require a richer conception of human action, thought and
flourishing.'65
As authors Goldman and Cox, a philosopher and an economist
respectively, put it, perfect knowledge is assumed "as a condition of
the optimal operation of the market, not as a consequence of the
market."' 66 And even in conditions of perfect knowledge:

164. See BRANDT, supra note 2, at 392-93.
165. White, supra note 69, at 810.
166. Goldman & Cox, supra note 29, at 20.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol.41:181

If people valued falsehood, then perfect competition would
provide falsehood in a Pareto-optimal way. Or, to make a
more realistic assumption, if truth is one thing people value,
but they are willing to substitute other commodities (e.g.,
entertainment) for truth, then economic theory says that
they will get the amount of truth such that the marginal rate
of substitution between truth and these other commodities
equals the marginal rate of transformation in the technology
between producing truth and producing other commodities.
If consumers do not value truth very much (relatively
speaking), perfect competition will efficiently ensure that
they don't get very much truth as compared with other
goods. 167
For First Amendment purposes, the question is, does the evidence of
existing incentive structures offer a basis for thinking that more truth
would be produced by more protection for commercial speech? It
would seem not. As Steve Shiffrin so forcefully argued:
Advertisers spend some sixty billion dollars per year to
disseminate their messages. 168' Those who would oppose
the materialist message must combat forces that have a
massive economic advantage. Any confidence that we will
know what is the truth by seeing what emerges from such
combat is ill placed. The inequality of inputs is structurally
based.'69
These inequalities of input cause predictable market failures for truth
in the marketplace of ideas. 7 ° Given those failures, more protection
167. Id. at 18.
168. This figure has increased quite a bit and probably grossly understates total marketing
expenditures of all kinds. Advertising Age reported that in 2006 advertisers spent S 104.8 billion
in spending on advertising in print, TV and some internet forms. Bradley Johnson, Leading
National Advertisers Report: Top 100 Spending Up 3.1% to $105 Billion, ADVERTISING AGE,
June 25, 2007, at 4. As a measure of the investment in marketing as a proportion of other
spending, the following information is instructive and suggestive even if it may not be reliably
extrapolated to other products and industries. "The Pharmaceutical industry spends more than
$5.5 billion to promote drugs to doctors each year-more than what all U.S. medical schools
spend to educate medical students." Waxman, supra note 133, at 2576-78. Additionally, a
"recent study by the pharmaceutical trade group found that its members employ some 86,226
individuals in marketing and only 51,588 in research and development." Juliet Fleming Brown,
Book Review, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 215, 221 (2006).
169. Shiffrin, Economic Regulation, supra note 3, at 1281.
170. For more discussion of the limitations of economics applied to law, see Guido Calabresi,
The Pointlessnessof Pareto. Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991).
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for commercial speech seems unlikely to produce more freedom or
more truth. Rather we should see the attempt to expand First
Amendment protection for commercial speech for what it is-a
"sophisticated attempt at putting forth a deregulatory agenda through
constitutional rhetoric-a role similar to that which the Due Process
and Contract Clauses occupied nearly a century ago."17 ' The struggle
over the legitimate boundaries of governmental regulation, whether
of speech or anything else, is indeed a persistent problem that will
not soon go away.

171.

Dibadj, supra note 15, at 915.
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